14a testified at trial, gave evidence that she had been sexually abused when transported across state lines as a minor. Counts Three and Four thus qualify as offenses, and § 3283 applies to those offenses. Second, Maxwell argues that Counts Three, Four, and Six of the Indictment are barred by the statute of limitations because the extended statute of limitations provided by the 2003 amendment to § 3283 does not apply to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court held that a court, in deciding whether a statute applies retroactively, must first “determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.” If Congress has done so, “the inquiry ends, and the court enforces the statute as it is written.” If the statute “is ambiguous or contains no express command regarding retroactivity, a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively impermissible retroactive effects.” Here, the inquiry is straightforward. In 20038, Con- gress amended § 3283 to provide: “No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.”*° The text of § 3283—that no statute of 73 511 US. 244, 280 (1994); see also Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55. #4 In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). * Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 55 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 26 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 650, 660 (20038). DOJ-OGR-00000077