13a those offenses that were committed before the enactment into law of the provision. On both points, we disagree and hold that the District Court correctly denied Maxwell’s motions to dismiss the charges as untimely. We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment and the application of a statute of limitations.”° First, Counts Three and Four of the Indictment are offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors. The District Court properly applied Weingarten v. United States.?! In Weingarten, we explained that Congress intended courts to apply § 3283 using a case-specific approach as opposed to a “categorical approach.” We see no reason to depart from our reasoning in Weingarten. Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual abuse of a minor for the purposes of § 3283 based on the facts of the case. Jane, one of the women who 20 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2018). 21 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d 299, 313 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). 2 The “categorical approach” is a method of statutory inter- pretation that requires courts to look "only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions” for sentencing and immigration purposes. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). We properly reasoned in Weingarten that § 3283 met none of the conditions listed by Taylor that might require application of the categorical approach. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. First, “[tlhe language of § 3283[] ... reaches beyond the offense and its legal elements to the conduct ‘involv[ed]’ in the offense.” Id. at 59- 60. Second, legislative history suggests that Congress intended § 3283 to be applied broadly. Id. at 60. Third, a case-specific approach would not produce practical difficulties or potential unfairness. Id. DOJ-OGR-00000076