14 by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. See also Commonwealth v. Cosby, 666 Pa. 416, 481-82, 252 A.3d 1092, 1131 (Pa. 2021) (finding by the Pennsylva- nia Supreme Court that a promise made by a prior prosecutor was binding on a subsequent one because “Tals prosecutors are vested with such ‘tremendous’ discretion and authority, our law has long recognized the special weight that must be accorded to their assurances.”). B. Ordinary principles of contract interpre- tation compel Annabi and Maxwell to be reversed. A plea agreement is a contract and is to be inter- preted according to ordinary contract principles. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 102 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678, 683 (4th Cir. 2016); Van Thournout, 100 F.3d at 594. In fact, in interpreting plea agreements, these ordi- nary contract principles are to be employed even more strongly in favor of the defendant because they “are supplemented with a concern that the bargaining process not violate the defendant’s right to fundamen- tal fairness under the Due Process Clause.” Williams, 102 F.3d at 927 Gnternal quotation omitted). See also United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195-96 (4th Cir. 2007); Van Thournout, 100 F.3d at 594. Pursuant to these standards of interpretation, words within a contract are to be afforded their ordinary meaning. And to the extent that there is an ambiguity, such an ambiguity is to be construed against the government.' ' In addition, as discussed below as to the particular plea agreement at issue in this case, the contract interpretation principle known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius compels a DOJ-OGR-00000056