13 made on behalf of the United States binds the entire United States unless it says so affirmatively (as, in fact, the agreement at issue here did for Epstein himself, but not for his co-conspirators). As set forth above, this is consistent with Santobello and Giglio, and with ordinary principles of contract interpreta- tion. And it is the only principled way to interpret the plain language of this agreement, as well as the available information on the parties’ intent. A. Both Annabi and the opinion below were wrongly decided under Santobello and Giglio. It is impossible to square the Second and Seventh Circuit’s policies on plea agreement interpretation with this Court’s holdings in Santobello. As this Court correctly determined in that case, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” 404 U.S. at 262. There is perhaps no promise the government makes within a plea agreement that is more fundamental than the promise that by pleading guilty, the defend- ant is resolving his or her legal culpability for the conduct at issue, and that after accepting and serving the penalty contemplated in the agreement, he or she can move forward without fear of additional prosecu- tion for that conduct. A defendant should be able to rely on a promise that the United States will not prosecute again, without being subject to a gotcha in some other jurisdiction that chooses to interpret that plain language promise in some other way. Only in this way can the pronouncement of Giglio be upheld, for “the prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made DOJ-OGR-00000055