Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page19 of 26 enough; the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maxwell’s motion for a new trial.*4 4. The District Court’s Response to a Jury Note Did Not Result in a Constructive Amendment of, or Prejudicial Variance from, the Allegations in the Indictment During jury deliberations, the jury sent the following jury note regarding Count Four of the Indictment: Under Count Four (4), if the defendant aided in the transportation of Jane’s return flight, but not the flight to New Mexico where/if the intent was for Jane to engage in sexual activity, can she be found guilty under the second element?* The District Court determined that it would not respond to the note directly because it was difficult to “parse factually and legally” and instead referred the jury to the second element of Count Four.*6 %4 Nor did the District Court err in questioning Juror 50 rather than allowing the parties to do so. In conducting a hearing on potential juror misconduct, “[w]e leave it to the district court’s discretion to decide the extent to which the parties may participate in questioning the witnesses, and whether to hold the hearing in camera.” United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1989). And while Maxwell contends that the District Court improperly limited questioning about Juror 50’s role in deliberations, she both waived that argument below and fails to show here how any such questioning would not be foreclosed by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). 3 A-238. 36 A-207-221. The District Court’s instruction on the second element of Count Four required the jury to find that “Maxwell knowingly transported Jane in interstate commerce with the 19 DOJ-OGR-00000020