20a not “uncertain whether [Maxwell] was convicted of conduct that was the subject of the grand jury’s indictment.” We also cannot conclude that the evidence at trial prejudicially varied from the Indictment. To allege a variance, a defendant “must establish that the evidence offered at trial differs materially from the evidence alleged in the indictment.”* To prevail and win reversal, the defendant must further show “that substantial prejudice occurred at trial as a result” of the variance.*® “A defendant cannot demonstrate that he has been prejudiced by a variance where the pleading and the proof substantially correspond, where the variance is not of a character that could have misled the defendant at the trial, and where the variance is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.”*’ For reasons similar to the ones noted above in the context of the constructive amendment, the evidence at trial did not prove facts “materially different” from the allegations in the Indictment.** The evidence indicated that Maxwell transported Jane to New York for sexual abuse and conspired to do the same. Maxwell knew that the evidence also included conduct jury is able to proceed properly with its deliberations, and [ ] has considerable discretion in determining how to respond to commu- nications indicating that the jury is experiencing confusion.”) 44 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 20038). *® Dove, 884 F.3d at 149 46 Td. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 47 Salmonese, 352 F.3d at 621-22 (citation and internal quota- tion marks omitted); see also Khalupsky, 5 F.4th at 294. * Dove, 884 F.3d at 149. DOJ-OGR-00000083