17a fact, as the District Court noted, Maxwell did not challenge the inclusion of other jurors who disclosed past experience with sexual abuse, assault, or harass- ment. This is enough; the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maxwell’s motion for a new trial.*4 4. The District Court's Response to a Jury Note Did Not Result in a Constructive Amendment of, or Prejudicial Variance from, the Allegations in the Indictment During jury deliberations, the jury sent the following jury note regarding Count Four of the Indictment: Under Count Four (4), if the defendant aided in the transportation of Jane’s return flight, but not the flight to New Mexico where/if the intent was for Jane to engage in sexual activity, can she be found guilty under the second element?* The District Court determined that it would not respond to the note directly because it was difficult to “parse factually and legally” and instead referred the 34 Nor did the District Court err in questioning Juror 50 rather than allowing the parties to do so. In conducting a hearing on potential juror misconduct, “[wle leave it to the district court’s discretion to decide the extent to which the parties may participate in questioning the witnesses, and whether to hold the hearing in camera.” United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1989). And while Maxwell contends that the District Court improperly limited questioning about Juror 50’s role in deliberations, she both waived that argument below and fails to show here how any such questioning would not be foreclosed by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). 35 A938, DOJ-OGR-00000080