18 OPR report, precludes application of Annabi in this case because the intent to bind the United States as a whole, and not just the Southern District of Florida, is clear. Third, the Second Circuit misplaced its reliance on a selective reading of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the United States Attorneys’ Manual to conclude that United States Attorneys are “cabined to their specific district unless otherwise directed.” 118 F.4th at 265. Yet the Second Circuit ignored the Manual’s admoni- tion that United States Attorneys who do not wish to bind other districts should explicitly limit the scope of a non-prosecution agreement to their districts. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual (updated Feb. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-fede ral-prosecution. The existence of this provision reveals that AUSAs can bind other districts and that it is the obligation of the government to make explicit any limitation in the scope of immunity, and not the other way around. Fourth, the recitals of the NPA reveal that the intent was for a broad, complete resolution of the matters addressed by the agreement. The NPA states that “Epstein seeks to resolve globally his state and federal criminal liability.” (App.25). It also states that “the interests of the United States, the State of Florida, and the Defendant will be served” by the agreement. (App.25-26, emphasis added). The recitals do not refer to the specific interests of the Southern District of Florida at all. DOJ-OGR-00000060