11 U.S. Attorney’s Office on behalf of the “Government” (defined in that agreement to include its “depart- ments, officers, agents, and agencies”) binds not just the office of the U.S. Attorney but also the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 35 F.3d at 1337-38. Although the plea agreement in that case defined broadly that all governmental agencies would be bound, the Ninth Circuit cited approvingly to the broader proposition that “the United States govern- ment as a whole uses United States Attorneys as its authorized agents to negotiate plea bargains in criminal cases, so their authorized agreements bind the government as a whole.” Id. at 1340. See also United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that although a plea agreement which specifically and expressly limits a non-prosecution promise to a particular U.S. attor- ney’s office is enforceable only against that office, this is an exception to the general principle that a plea agreement is binding upon all districts). B. The Second and the Seventh Circuits apply the opposite presumption. They refuse to enforce a promise made on behalf of the “United States” or “the Government” except against the particular United States Attorney’s office which entered into the agreement, unless the agreement expressly reiterates that the term “United States” does in fact mean the entire country as a whole. Second Circuit. In the decision below, in reliance on Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, the Second Circuit held that the government’s promise that the “United States” would not prosecute any of the defendant’s co-conspirators was only enforceable in the Southern DOJ-OGR-00000053