8 factor is that, when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Jd. And in Giglio v. United States, this Court found that “the prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Yet despite this binding precedent, the Second Circuit refuses to hold its United States prosecutors to the promises that other United States prosecutors have made on behalf of the United States, instead clinging to the position that a plea agreement binds only the district in which it was entered unless it expressly states otherwise, even if the promise is made on behalf of the “United States.” (App.8-12). The Seventh Circuit similarly applies a narrow interpreta- tion of who is bound by a pledge on behalf of the “United States” or the “Government.” This policy jeop- ardizes the integrity of the plea negotiation process nationwide, which is “an essential component of the administration of justice” that “presupposels] fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261. The Second and Seventh Circuit’s policy is squarely in conflict with that of the Third, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, creating a circuit split with nationwide ramifications pursuant to which the same plea agree- ment can receive a different interpretation throughout the country on one of its most fundamental aspects (a defendant’s potential future criminal liability). This case provides an ideal opportunity to resolve this DOJ-OGR-00000050